The majority of business valuations do not become a component of litigation. Other than professional litigation support appraisers and appraisers working on valuations for gift or estate taxes, most appraisers don't think in terms of defending their valuation or components of the valuation, such as the DLOM, in court. Yet many valuations do become evidence in court proceedings, sometimes years after the valuation report has been delivered. Certainly one of the most challenged aspects of valuations in recent years has been the DLOM. The DLOM is a major concern of the IRS (See Discussions on DLOM, "The Job Aid for IRS Valuation Professionals"). The following checklist was developed from the many court decisions, from both the Tax Court and the appellate courts, that found one party's (or both parties') evidence and/or development process of the DLOM to be lacking.

  1. Your DLOM, like the rest of your valuation, must take into account all of the factors that influence the operation and success of the underlying business, as well as the liquidity and marketability of the subject business interest, including the so-called Mandelbaum factors:

    This view has been reinforced by numerous court decisions, including Berg, where the court commented, "...the valuation of the appropriate discounts must take into account all relevant facts and circumstances of the particular corporation at issue," and "Because of his analysis of specific factors related to the value of the decedent's interest in [the subject company], [the IRS' expert's] methodology is convincing and superior to that of petitioner's expert witnesses."ii

    [Ed: Note the references to "corporation" in the foregoing and remember to substitute the appropriate form of business for your valuation, noting the impact the form of business (FLP, LP, LLC, etc.) may have on marketability, such as the Tax Effect issue in Grossiii.]

  2. Don't "borrow" a DLOM range or value from a court case unless the underlying facts of the subject interest closely match those of the case. Otherwise, the court is likely to disregard your DLOM. As the court stated in Peracchio, "To the extent [the expert] believes that the benchmark range of discounts we utilized in Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, supra, is controlling in this or any other case, he is mistaken." See also Bergv.
  3. Carefully document the factors and empirical data that went into the development of the DLOM, or risk the Court finding the other party's explanation and data to be more persuasive. In Okerlund, the court remarked, "...we are troubled by the lack of any clear connection between the [expert's] reports' general discussion of restricted stock and pre-IPO studies and the marketability discounts applied to the [company] subject interests.vi, See also True, "As noted, the estate's experts based their minority and lack of marketability discounts on general studies and not on the facts of this case"vii and Thompsonviii. Wherever possible, use data from transactions from a time period close to the valuation date. See Dallas, where the court noted, "We believe [the expert] should have used the discount studies from the period that includes the transactions at issue.ix
  4. While appraisers are always expected to prepare a valuation in accord with the purpose of the valuation, appraisers should bear in mind the requirements of state statutes that specify how a business interest is to be valued. State courts have found repeatedly that a minority discount or DLOM may not be appropriate in such cases as statutory appraisalsx and dissenting shareholdersxi. Similarly, if issues of control affect the DLOM, be aware of state laws that control such issues as partition of a business interestxii. State statutes may also impact the DLOM in the tax court, as the effect of state law transfer restrictions on the interests in Truexiii.
  5. If you have previously prepared another valuation, especially with a DLOM, on the subject business interest or the underlying business itself, you may need to explain the factors and methodology that resulted in a different valuation or risk having your present valuation and DLOM questioned. See Gallo, where "The Court permitted respondent to cross-examine [taxpayers' experts] with regard to the earlier reports to uncover any inconsistencies in methodology with their later reports."xiv See also Litchfieldxv
  6. Be certain that any restrictions on sale of interests that are factored into your DLOM binds the interests themselves and not the present owner. If the owner dies, the restrictions would not affect the next owner. See Foster, where the court stated, "...because the restrictions applied only to decedent, not the underlying assets of the trust themselves."xvi
  7. If you have applied a discount for minority control and a DLOM, beware of an overlap and be sure that the two discounts are not combined. The courts view these as distinct, as the court noted in Andrews, "In their arguments, neither petitioner nor respondent clearly focuses on the fact that two conceptually distinct discounts are involved here, one for lack of marketability and the other for lack of control."xvii Be aware that more than once the Tax Court has found the combined value to be too high, as in Litchfield, where the court commented, "We, however, regard the estate expert's ... marketability discounts, particularly when combined with the ...lack of control discounts we allow, to be high."xviii See also Judge Laro's 2003 presentationxix and Hessxx.
  8. Resist the urge to find a special group of investors to justify a DLOM different than that required for the hypothetical investor. This approach has been rejected not only by the Tax Court in Heckxxi, but also by the 9th Circuit in Simplotxxii. In Gallo, the court dealt with the IRS contention that the purchaser should be presumed to be a member of the family thusly, "Respondent is desperately reaching for some support for the unsupportable."xxiii
  9. Avoid reliance on previously published (or benchmark) studies, such as pre-IPO studies, as the courts have shown an increasing unwillingness to rely on aging data and discounts drawn on studies vs. the facts of the case, as in Thompsonxxiv. Be aware that using such studies may also introduce a range of discounts the court can draw on to select a DLOM adverse to your client's interests.
  10. Note that an exposure to capital gains tax for the subject company may result in a higher DLOM, although the actual amount may be disputed, as the tax court noted in Estate of Lutonxxv, and quoted itself in Davis, "NOTWITHSTANDING THE POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF ANY CORPORATE LEVEL TAX, WE DO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME DISCOUNT IS IN ORDER. WE BELIEVE SUCH DISCOUNT IS APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED IN THE DISCOUNT FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY."xxvi (emphasis by the court).
  11. If you favor pre-IPO studies as determinative of marketability discounts, you may wish to develop one of your own. Bear in mind that pre-IPO studies, both previously published and developed by the appraiser, have come under attack repeatedly, as in McCordxxvii.
  12. Use a restricted stock study in developing and supporting a DLOM. The Tax Court has found such studies to be probative in determining a DLOM, as in McCordxxviii and Peracchioxxix. The Mandelbaumxxx court, in addition to its stress on factors (above) used one of the appraiser's restricted stock studies in determining its DLOM. Be sure to document the criteria used for selecting companies for your study and analyze the data from these companies as they relate to the subject business interest, or you run the risk of the court rejecting your conclusion. As the court noted in Lappo, "We are unpersuaded that these [selected] companies are comparable to the [subject company]".xxxi The court made a similar comment in Deputy, where the court noted, "Neither party's expert attempted to persuade us to rely or not to rely on the various studies he referenced."xxxii See also Peracchio, where the court commented, "While restricted stock studies certainly have some probative value in the context of marketability discount analysis, see, e.g., McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 390-393, [the expert] makes no attempt whatsoever to analyze the data from those studies as they relate to the transferred interests."xxxiii Finally, note that the Tax Court has stated that "as similarity to the company to be valued decreases, the number of required comparables increases'."xxxiv

Because, as we noted above, the IRS is very focused on DLOMs in valuations, if there is a tax consequence of your valuation, it has a greater opportunity to be challenged—perhaps in court. It is certainly not our role to suggest how to construct your DLOM, but simply to point out those approaches to a DLOM that have drawn the ire of one court or another, along with some that have received support. Many of the cases mentioned in our not-exhaustive list illustrate appraiser approaches that have been criticized by the court, which is a learning opportunity for us all. As Brandon Mull, author of Fablehaven, noted, "Smart people learn from their mistakes. But the real sharp ones learn from the mistakes of others."


i Bernard Mandelbaum, et al, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo 1995-255 (consolidated cases for Docket Nos. 20517-92, 20678-92, 20687-92, 20688-92, 20689-92, 12749-94, 12750-94, 12751-94, 12752-94, 12753-94, 12754-94, 12755-94, 12756-94, 12757-94, 12758-94, 12759-94, 12760-94, 12761-94, 12762-94, 12763-94 June 12, 1995, as corrected June 20, 1995)
ii Estate of Berg v. Commissioner TC Memo 1991-279
iii Walter L. Gross, Jr., and Barbara H. Gross, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue T.C. Memo 1999-254
iv Peter S. Peracchio, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2003-280
v Berg, citation above
vi Jeffrey L. Okerlund and Lorrie Schwan-Okerlund; David J. Schwan and Diane D. Schwan; Mark D. Schwan; and Paul M. Schwan and Christine H. M. Weigel-Schwann, Plaintiffs v. The United States, Defendant (Consolidated with Lorrie Schwan-Okerlund and Jeffery L. Okerlund v. United States, Defendant) 53 Fed. Cl. 341
vii Estate of H. A. True, Jr., Deceased, H. A. True III, Personal Representative and Jean D. True, et al, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2001-167 2001
viii Estate of Josephine T. Thompson, Deceased, Car l T. Holst-Knudsen and the Bank of New York, Executors, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2004-174
ix Robert Dallas, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2006-212
x CAVALIER OIL CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. William J. HARNETT, an individual, Defendant Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Supreme Court of Delaware, 564 A. 2d 1137. Submitted March 28, 1989. Decided September 5, 1989, and Emanuel BALSAMIDES, Sr., Emanuel Balsamides, Jr. and Thomas Balsamides, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v PROTAMEEN CHEMICALS, INC., Adam Perle, Daniel Perle, Manlen Realty Corp. and Relco Chemical Co., Inc., Defendants, and Leonard M. Perle, Defendant-Respondent. Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued May 3, 1999. Decided July 14, 1999.
xi HMO-W, Inc. v SSM Health Care System, 228 Wis 2d 815, 598 NW2d 577 (1999)
xii The Estate of Mary Frances Smith Bright, Deceased, by H. R. Bright, Independent Executor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant. No. 78-2221. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. October 1, 1981
xiii Estate of H. A. True, Jr., Deceased, H. A. True III Personal Representative; Jean D. True, et al, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T. C. Memo 2001-167 p 211
xiv Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1985-363; 1985
xv Estate of Marjorie Degreeff Litchfield, Deceased, George B. Snell and Peter Degreeff Jacobi, Co-executors, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2009-21
xvi Estate of Ellen D. Foster, Deceased, Ashley Bradley and Tara Shapiro, Co-Executors, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2011-95
xvii Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 79 T.C. 952-953
xviii Litchfield, citation above
xix David Laro (2003) "Valuation Issues: A Perspective from a U.S. Tax Court Judge"AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS 22ND ANNUAL ADVANCED BUSINESS VALUATION CONFERENCE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
xx Johann and Johanna Hess v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo 2003-251
xxi Estate of Richie C. Heck, Deceased, Gary Heck, Special Administrator, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo 2002-34
xxii Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner 249 F.3d,1191 9th Cir. 2001
xxiii Gallo, p 61
xxiv Thompson, citation above
xxv Estate of William F. Luton, Deceased, Nancy L. Jackson, Robert S. Herdman, and William F. Luton, Jr., Co-Exuctors v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 1994-539
xxvi Estate of Artemus D. Davis, Deceased, Robert D. Davis, Personal Representative, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 110 T.C. 530 1998
xxvii Charles T. McCord, Jr., and Mary S. McCord, Donors, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent 120 T.C. No. 13 2003
xxviii McCord, citation above
xxix Peracchio, citation above
xxx Mandelbaum, citation above
xxxi Clarissa W. Lappo, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T. C. Memo 2003-258
xxxii Estate of Helen A. Deputy, Deceased, William J. Deputy, Co-Executor, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo 2003-176
xxxiii Peracchio, citation above
xxxiv Estate of Webster E. Kelley, Deceased, John R. Louden and Patricia Louden, Personal Representatives, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent T.C. Memo. 2005-235, citing McCord v. Commissioner, Heck v. Commissioner and Lappo V. Commissioner.